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SQUEEZING AND THE LIMITS OF 
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRABILITY 
SANDEEP VAHEESAN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On September 11, 2007, a Ninth Circuit panel held in Pacific Bell 
Telephone Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., that linkLine’s “price 
squeeze” claim against Pacific Bell stated a valid cause of action 
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act (“Section 2”).1 As DSL providers, 
linkLine and the other respondents (“linkLine”) purchased wholesale 
network access (“DSL transport”) from Pacific Bell and competed 
against Pacific Bell in the retail DSL market. linkLine alleged that 
Pacific Bell had raised the price of DSL transport and concurrently 
lowered the price of its retail DSL to squeeze linkLine’s profit 
margins and drive it out of the California market.2 The court rejected 
Pacific Bell’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and found that 
linkLine’s price squeeze claim survived the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko,3 which held 
that Verizon’s alleged violation of a statutory duty to deal was not a 
cause of action under Section 2.4 On June 23, 2008, the Supreme Court 
 
 * 2010 J.D./M.A. (Economics) Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 503 F.3d 876, 877 (9th Cir. 2007); 15 
U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2008) (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or 
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony  
. . . .”). 
 2. linkLine, 503 F.3d at 877–78. 
 3. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 416 (2004). 
 4. See linkLine, 503 F.3d at 883 (“First, as the Eleventh Circuit has underscored, Trinko 
did not involve a price squeezing theory. Indeed, Trinko took great care to explain that in this 
particular regulatory context, ‘claims that satisfy established antitrust standards’ are preserved. 
Because a price squeeze theory formed part of the fabric of traditional antitrust law prior to 
Trinko, those claims should remain viable notwithstanding either the telecommunications 
statutes or Trinko.” (citations omitted)). 
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granted Pacific Bell’s petition for a writ of certiorari to review the 
Ninth Circuit’s ruling.5 
II.  FACTS 
“Broadband” internet, with its high download speeds and 
reliability, is the most popular means of accessing the internet among 
residential and commercial customers.6 Digital subscriber lines 
(“DSL”) are among the most popular forms of broadband and offer 
reception speeds about fifty times faster than dialup connections.7 
Unlike other forms of broadband, DSL can be provided over existing 
telephone infrastructure.8 Pacific Bell provides retail DSL service to 
residential and commercial customers.9 Pacific Bell also owns the 
“last-mile” connections in most of California; these lines run from 
Pacific Bell’s central offices to customers’ homes or offices. These 
“last-mile” connections, because of their natural monopoly 
characteristics, are considered “essential” facilities.10 Because they do 
not own the last mile connections necessary to reach customers, non-
affiliated DSL providers, like linkLine, must purchase DSL transport, 
i.e., access to last-mile connections, from Pacific Bell.11 To ensure that 
incumbents such as Pacific Bell do not abuse their control of essential 
facilities and extend their monopolies to downstream markets such as 
retail DSL, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) has 
enacted a series of regulations under the Communications Act of 
1934.12 FCC rules require that landline phone monopolies that 
provide DSL service must also provide DSL transport to non-
affiliated providers on a non-discriminatory basis.13 
linkLine alleged that, in spite of the FCC’s regulatory regime, 
Pacific Bell abused its ownership and control of essential facilities in 
 
 5. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 503 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 
128 S. Ct. 2957 (June 23, 2008) (No. 07-512). 
 6. Joint Appendix at 15, linkLine, 128 S. Ct. 2957 (No. 07-512). 
 7. Id. at 15–16. 
 8. Id. at 15. 
 9. Id. at 16. 
 10. Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: A Principle in Need of Some Limiting Principles, 58 
ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1989) (“A single firm’s facility . . . is ‘essential’ only when it is both critical 
to the plaintiff’s competitive vitality and the plaintiff is essential for competition in the 
marketplace. ‘Critical to the plaintiff's competitive vitality’ means that the plaintiff cannot 
compete effectively without it and that duplication or practical alternatives are not available.”). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Brief for Petitioner at 5, linkLine, 128 S. Ct. 2957 (No. 07-512). 
 13. Id. at 3. 
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violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.14 Specifically, linkLine 
claimed that Pacific Bell charged independent Internet Service 
Providers (“ISPs”) “wholesale prices that were too high in relation to 
prices at which [Pacific Bell was] providing retail DSL services and 
necessary equipment to end-user customers,” as part of a so-called 
price squeeze strategy.15 According to linkLine, Pacific Bell charged 
retail prices that were, on occasion, lower than the amount linkLine 
paid to Pacific Bell for DSL transport.16 The respondents asserted that 
if they matched Pacific Bell’s retail prices, they would not be able to 
cover their costs of providing service.17 Similarly, linkLine contended 
that Pacific Bell would not be able to earn a profit on its retail service 
if Pacific Bell were paying the same wholesale prices as the 
respondents.18 Through this strategy, linkLine argued, Pacific Bell 
sought to eliminate profit margins for non-affiliated DSL providers to 
drive them out of the market and to establish a monopoly in the retail 
DSL service market.19 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Ninth Circuit based its ruling that linkLine’s price squeeze 
claim stated a valid Section 2 cause of action on a long line of cases 
dating back to 1945. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America 
(“Alcoa”), the Second Circuit explained the mechanics of an 
anticompetitive price squeeze.20 Town of Concord v. Boston Edison 
Co.21 and City of Anaheim v. Southern California Edison Co.22 
examined the intersection of antitrust and regulation in the context of 
electricity and stressed that the presence of regulation reduces or 
even removes the need for antitrust remedies.23 In cases with fact 
patterns virtually identical to those in linkLine, both the D.C.24 and 
the Eleventh25 Circuits recently considered price squeeze claims and 
denied relief to the plaintiffs. Lastly, although it did not directly 
 
 14. Joint Appendix, supra note 6, at 17–18. 
 15. Id. at 35. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 36. 
 19. Id. at 38. 
 20. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 21. Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 30–31 (1st Cir. 1990). 
 22. City of Anaheim v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373, 1377 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Covad Commc’ns Co. v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 398 F.3d 666, 673 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 25. Covad Commc’ns Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 374 F.3d 1044, 1050 (11th Cir. 2004). 
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address price squeezes, the Supreme Court’s holding in Verizon 
Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko must be considered 
in any case at the intersection of antitrust and regulation. 
A.  Alcoa: The Progenitor of Price Squeezes 
In Alcoa, defendant Alcoa was an unregulated firm that produced 
aluminum ingot, manufactured aluminum sheet using the ingot, and 
sold its ingot to other sheet rollers.26 The government claimed, inter 
alia, that Alcoa raised the price of ingot it sold to rival sheet rollers 
and concurrently slashed the price of the sheet it produced.27 The 
Second Circuit held that three elements must be satisfied for a 
successful price squeeze claim: 1) the firm conducting the squeeze has 
monopoly power at the first industry level; 2) its price at the first level 
is higher than a “fair price”; and 3) its price at the second level is so 
low that its competitors cannot match the price and still make “living 
profits.”28 The court found that Alcoa met the first element by 
monopolizing the market for aluminum ingot.29 Upon an examination 
of aluminum ingot and sheet price data, the court also found that 
Alcoa’s pricing practices had deprived rival sheet makers of a “living 
profit,” thereby meeting the third element of the test.30 This practice 
forced rival sheet manufacturers to leave the industry, thereby 
establishing the second element that Alcoa sold ingot to rivals at 
“higher than a ‘fair price.’”31 
B.  Price Squeezes in Fully Regulated Industries 
In Town of Concord and in City of Anaheim, the defendants were 
franchised utilities that generated, transmitted, and distributed 
electricity and that owned the entire relevant infrastructure.32 The 
plaintiffs were municipally-owned distribution companies that 
purchased power from the defendants and “wheeled” power from 
other generators over the defendants’ transmission lines.33 The 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and state public utility 
 
 26. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 436. 
 27. Id. at 437–38. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 438. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 19, 20 (1st Cir. 1990); City of 
Anaheim v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373, 1375 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 33. Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 20; City of Anaheim, 955 F.2d at 1376. 
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commissions regulated the defendants at the wholesale and retail 
levels, respectively.34 The municipalities alleged that, in spite of this 
comprehensive regulatory oversight, the defendants had manipulated 
their regulatory filings to eliminate the plaintiffs’ profit margins.35 
In Town of Concord, the First Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s price 
squeeze claim, basing its ruling on the presence of comprehensive 
regulation. In dicta, the court described the economics of price 
squeezing, which are not always anticompetitive and, in fact, can be 
procompetitive.36 First, by driving out less efficient independent 
competitors in the downstream market, price squeezes can save 
economic resources so that they can be used elsewhere in a more 
productive capacity.37 Second, when independent monopolies exist at 
the upstream and the downstream levels, price squeezes can increase 
consumer welfare.38 Under this ‘vertical separation,’ monopoly 
markups are added at each stage of production; consequently, 
consumers pay a higher final price.39 The replacement of the two 
independent monopolies by a single integrated monopoly can 
eliminate this so-called double marginalization problem.40 
On the other hand, price squeezes can also have anticompetitive 
effects. First, they can eliminate downstream rivals and thus reduce 
non-price competition, which is an important competitive dimension 
in many industries.41 Second, a price squeeze permits the upstream 
monopolist to extend its monopoly power into the downstream 
market; this reduces the likelihood of a new competitor successfully 
entering the market and so fortifies the monopolist’s existing market 
power.42 Given the ambiguous effects of price squeezes, only a 
detailed factual inquiry can determine the exact consumer welfare 
effects of a specific allegation of price squeezing. 
Because both levels of the market were regulated, the court in 
Town of Concord reasoned that these administrative processes can 
prevent anticompetitive price squeezes.43 Although the court stressed 
 
 34. Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 20; City of Anaheim, 955 F.2d at 1375. 
 35. Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 20–21; City of Anaheim, 955 F.2d at 1376. 
 36. Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 23. 
 37. Id. at 23–24. 
 38. Id. at 24. 
 39. Id. 
 40. LUIS M.B. CABRAL, INTRODUCTION TO INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 190–92 (2000). 
 41. Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 24. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 25. 
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that institutional considerations required it to deny this plaintiff’s 
claim, it did not categorically reject all price squeeze claims.44 The 
court held only that full regulation bars price squeeze claims,45 and 
that price squeeze claims in unregulated or partly regulated industries 
may still warrant antitrust scrutiny.46 
In contrast to the First Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, in City of 
Anaheim, held that the mere presence of full regulatory oversight 
does not categorically bar price squeeze claims.47 The court found that 
regulation alters the calculus for the judiciary when it considers 
antitrust claims, and said that “concerns [of anticompetitive price 
squeezes] are attenuated in the electrical industry whose rates are 
regulated at both the wholesale and retail levels.”48 The court 
reasoned that because of regulatory imperfections, a regulated 
monopolist could still “manipulate its filings . . . in a manner that 
causes a, at least temporary, squeeze which might be just as effective 
as one perpetrated by an unregulated actor.”49 To prevent antitrust 
from unduly encroaching on the territory of regulation, the court 
required plaintiffs to prove specific intent when alleging price 
squeezes in regulated environments.50 The City of Anaheim’s price 
squeeze claim was rejected because the court found that Edison was 
legitimately maximizing its own profits, not improperly forcing the 
plaintiff out of the retail distribution business.51 
C.  Price Squeezes in the DSL Market 
The D.C. Circuit in Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atlantic 
Corp. and the Eleventh Circuit in Covad Communications Co. v. 
BellSouth Corp., each considered allegations essentially identical to 
those of linkLine.52 In both cases, a vertically-integrated DSL provider 
allegedly raised the price of DSL transport and simultaneously 
reduced the price of its retail DSL.53 
 
 44. Id. at 29. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. City of Anaheim v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373, 1377 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 1378. 
 51. Id. at 1379. 
 52. Covad Commc’ns Co. v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 398 F.3d 666, 673 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Covad 
Commc’ns Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 374 F.3d 1044, 1050 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 53. Bell Atlantic, 398 F.3d at 673; BellSouth, 374 F.3d at 1050. 
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In Bell Atlantic, the D.C. Circuit held that the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Trinko barred price squeezes.54 Swiftly dismissing Covad’s 
price squeeze claim, the court stated that “it makes no sense to 
prohibit a predatory price squeeze in circumstances where the 
integrated monopolist is free to refuse to deal.”55 In BellSouth, the 
Eleventh Circuit ostensibly allowed Covad’s price squeeze claim to 
proceed.56 The court, however, confused price squeezing with 
predatory pricing, two similar-sounding practices that are clearly 
distinguishable from each other. The focus in a predatory pricing 
claim is on the defendant’s pricing conduct; in a price squeezing claim, 
the focus is on how the defendant’s conduct reduced or eliminated the 
plaintiff’s profit margins. The Eleventh Circuit described Covad’s 
claim as a price squeeze and yet applied the test for predatory 
pricing.57 The court allowed Covad’s claim to survive summary 
judgment because it satisfied the two-prong test for predation set out 
in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.: 1) 
BellSouth priced its DSL below an appropriate measure of its costs; 
and 2) BellSouth had a dangerous probability of recovering its losses 
from the below-cost pricing.58 Covad’s claim survived BellSouth’s 
motion to dismiss because it met the criteria for a predatory pricing 
claim, not because it met the criteria for price squeezing. 
D.  Trinko: The Intersection Between Antitrust and Regulation 
In the Supreme Court’s landmark Trinko decision, the respondent 
alleged that Verizon had, inter alia, failed to provide a landline 
telephone rival with adequate access to its network,59 and that 
Verizon’s breach of its statutory duty to share also constituted a 
violation of Section 2.60 The Supreme Court held that Verizon’s refusal 
to deal with a rival in the landline telephone market was not an 
antitrust violation.61 An underpinning of the Court’s decision was the 
FCC’s regulatory oversight of Verizon.62 The Court reasoned that the 
 
 54. Bell Atlantic, 398 F.3d at 673. 
 55. Id. (citing 3A PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 129 (2d 
ed. 2002)). 
 56. BellSouth, 374 F.3d at 1050. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 1051 (citing Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 
209, 222 (1993)). 
 59. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 404–05 (2004). 
 60. Id. at 405. 
 61. Id. at 415. 
 62. Id. at 411–13. 
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FCC’s oversight reduced the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct 
and found that, in fact, the regulatory regime had worked as intended 
in this particular instance.63 Because of this regulatory structure, the 
marginal benefit of Section 2 liability as a “backstop” against 
anticompetitive conduct would be slight and therefore did not 
warrant incurring the potentially significant administrative and error 
costs associated with antitrust litigation.64 
IV.  HOLDING 
In Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., the 
Ninth Circuit rejected Pacific Bell’s motion to dismiss and held that 
price squeeze allegations in partially-regulated industries do state a 
valid cause of action under Section 2.65 The court held that price 
squeezes are consistent with Trinko and with a significant body of 
appellate-level rulings.66 The majority’s opinion elicited a strong 
dissent from Judge Ronald Gould.67 
The majority emphasized that Trinko did not involve price 
squeezes and that the Supreme Court “took great care to explain that 
in this particular regulatory context, ‘claims that satisfy established 
antitrust standards’ are preserved.”68 The majority found that the 
Trinko court—though it stressed the existence of a regulatory 
structure when it rejected the plaintiff’s claim—did not hold that 
regulation was a per se bar on antitrust claims.69 Rather, the existence 
of a regulatory structure was just “one factor of particular 
importance” for a court to consider when deciding antitrust matters.70 
 
 63. Id. at 413 (“The regulatory response to the OSS failure complained of in respondent's 
suit provides a vivid example of how the regulatory regime operates. When several competitive 
LECs complained about deficiencies in Verizon's servicing of orders, the FCC and PSC 
responded.”). 
 64. Id. at 414 (“Against the slight benefits of antitrust intervention here, we must weigh a 
realistic assessment of its costs. Under the best of circumstances, applying the requirements of § 
2 ‘can be difficult’ because ‘the means of illicit exclusion, like the means of legitimate 
competition, are myriad.’” (quoting United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 
2001))). 
 65. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 503 F.3d 876, 885 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 66. Id. at 883. 
 67. Id. at 885. 
 68. Id. at 883 (quoting Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, 540 U.S. 
398, 406 (2004)). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
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The Ninth Circuit then looked to how other circuits had applied 
Trinko to price squeeze claims, but found no definitive guidance.71 
The court also saw no need to reconsider its City of Anaheim v. 
Southern California Edison Co. ruling in light of Trinko. Both City of 
Anaheim and Trinko viewed regulation as an important factor, but not 
a dispositive one, when a court ruled on an antitrust claim.72 Although 
City of Anaheim urged caution before imposing antitrust liability on a 
regulated company, the court also acknowledged that price squeezes 
could arise even in fully regulated sectors because of deceptive and 
fraudulent rate filings.73 The court held that if price squeezes could be 
implemented in fully-regulated sectors they could, by implication, also 
occur in partially-regulated industries.74 The court underscored that 
although wholesale rates are subject to FCC regulation, retail prices 
are determined entirely by market forces and face no external 
constraint other than the antitrust laws.75 
Judge Gould’s dissent argued that Trinko did bar price squeeze 
claims because a monopolist that can refuse to deal under the 
antitrust laws, by extension, also enjoys complete discretion over 
pricing.76 If, however, the plaintiffs could establish a predatory pricing 
claim that satisfied the requirements of the Brooke Group Ltd. v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. test, Judge Gould noted, their 
complaint would survive a summary judgment motion.77 
V.  ANALYSIS 
For both economic and institutional-competence reasons, the 
Ninth Circuit erred in Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine 
Communications, Inc., by allowing the plaintiffs’ price squeeze claim 
to proceed. First, the court failed to adequately examine the 
economics of price squeezing and ignored the possibility that it can be 
procompetitive. Second, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling will force the 
federal courts to act as direct price administrators, which is a 
 
 71. Id. at 881 (“[The Trinko] holding raised the question of whether a price squeeze is 
merely another term of the deal governed by the Supreme Court's analysis in Trinko, or 
whether it is something else. The D.C. and Eleventh Circuits have offered conflicting answers to 
that question.”). 
 72. Id. at 883. 
 73. Id. at 883–84. 
 74. Id. at 884. 
 75. Id. at 885. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 887. 
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problematic requirement that is especially unnecessary in markets in 
which specialized regulatory agencies already perform this function. 
The Ninth Circuit’s ruling thus creates the exact situation the Trinko 
court sought to avoid: supplementary antitrust remedies that are 
likely to provide only slight marginal benefits but that will impose 
potentially significant administrative and economic costs.78 
A.  The Shaky Economic Foundations of the Ninth Circuit’s Ruling 
Perhaps because the opinion did not consider Town of Concord v. 
Boston Edison Co.,79 the Ninth Circuit did not recognize the uncertain 
economic effects of price squeezes. As then-Judge Breyer wrote in 
Town of Concord, price squeezes, unlike, for example, collusion, can 
have both anticompetitive and procompetitive effects.80 In their 
complaint, the linkLine respondents failed to specifically state how 
the price squeeze harmed competition, and instead gave only 
conclusory statements about the anticompetitive effects on the 
marketplace.81 By focusing strictly on the plaintiff’s claims of harm to 
itself rather than on harm to the overall competitive process, the court 
ignored modern antitrust’s goal of promoting consumer welfare.82 
When the court allowed the respondents’ price squeeze claim to 
survive Pacific Bell’s motion to dismiss, it disregarded the possibility 
that price squeezing can, in fact, be procompetitive. First, price 
squeezes can increase consumer surplus in markets in which separate 
monopolies exist at the upstream and downstream levels.83 The 
upstream monopolist, through a price squeeze, can expand 
downstream and eliminate the independent downstream monopolist.84 
Although these price squeezes harm the downstream monopolist, 
 
 78. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004) 
(“Against the slight benefits of antitrust intervention here, we must weigh a realistic assessment 
of its costs. Under the best of circumstances, applying the requirements of § 2 ‘can be difficult’ 
because ‘the means of illicit exclusion, like the means of legitimate competition, are myriad.’” 
quoting United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir 2001))). 
 79. Town of Concord lays out the economics and institutional considerations in 
adjudicating price squeeze claims more thoroughly than any recent court opinion. See supra Part 
III.B. 
 80. Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 24–25 (1st Cir. 1990). 
 81. Brief in Opposition at 1, Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2957 
(2007) (No. 07–512). 
 82. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993) 
(quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)). 
 83. Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 25. 
 84. Id. 
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they benefit consumers by eliminating the double marginalization 
problem whereby consumers have to pay two levels of monopoly 
profits.85 The replacement of two independent monopolies with a 
single monopoly thus results in lower prices.86 Second, price squeezes 
can eliminate inefficient downstream competitors and induce the 
reallocation of these economic resources to more productive uses 
elsewhere.87 By adopting a permissible stance towards price squeeze 
claims, the Ninth Circuit ruling, in some circumstances, frustrates the 
possibility of welfare-enhancing conduct. 
In addition to potentially preventing efficiency-enhancing vertical 
integration and market exit, the threat of price squeeze liability may 
also deter procompetitive price cuts at the retail level. Vertically-
integrated firms may worry that if they slash retail prices, they will 
invite allegations of price squeezing from downstream competitors.88 
Even if they ultimately prevail in court, firms may maintain 
supracompetitive retail prices to avoid the significant costs of 
defending themselves against such price squeeze claims. Although 
these higher retail prices ensure the continued profitability of 
downstream competitors, they are unambiguously bad for consumers 
and social welfare. The court, in rejecting Pacific Bell’s motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, returned to the competition policy of the 
mid-twentieth century in which antitrust was, according to a leading 
scholar, at “war with itself.”89 
The court also speciously applied the Trinko ruling. If a 
monopolist has no general duty to deal with a rival, it is illogical to 
require that it deal under specific terms when it voluntarily chooses to 
 
 85. CABRAL, supra note 40, at 190–92. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 24–25. 
 88. J. Gregory Sidak, Abolishing the Price Squeeze as a Theory of Antitrust Liability, 4 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 279, 297 (2008). 
 89. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 7 
(1978) (“Certain [antitrust doctrines] preserve competition, while others suppress it, resulting in 
a policy at war with itself.”); Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, An Antitrust 
Progress Report for the FTC: Past, Present and Future, Remarks Before the Antitrust 1996 
Conference (Mar. 4, 1996), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/speech4.shtm 
(“Riding the crest of World War II successes and implementing the pent-up technology of the 
1930s and the war years, American industry seemed invincible. In that frame of mind why not 
err on the side of preserving large numbers of rivals, and limiting their collaboration? Even if 
efficiency or innovation suffered what did that matter?” (quoting Phillip Areeda, Antitrust Law 
as Industrial Policy: Should Judges and Juries Make It? in ANTITRUST INNOVATION AND 
COMPETITIVENESS 35 (Jorde & Teece eds., 1992))). 
DO NOT DELETE 12/30/2008  4:56:54 PM 
140 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 4:129 
deal.90 Such a rule will only deter voluntary dealing in the future, as 
courts may impose liability on those transactions because of alleged 
price squeezing.91 Instead of dealing (and risking antitrust liability), 
vertically-integrated firms with an upstream monopoly may simply 
refuse to deal with downstream rivals, or to deal only insofar as 
required by regulation.92 Thus, price squeezing, without an affirmative 
duty to deal, may have the perverse effect of discouraging welfare-
enhancing inter-firm dealing. 
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit found a split between the D.C. and 
Eleventh Circuits because it misread the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in 
BellSouth and failed to appreciate the substantive economic 
differences between price squeezing and predatory pricing. The 
BellSouth court allowed the price squeeze to proceed if the plaintiff 
could satisfy the two-part Brooke Group test, which applies to 
predatory pricing claims.93 To establish such claims, the plaintiff must 
show that: 1) the defendant priced its product below an appropriate 
measure of its costs; and 2) the defendant had a dangerous probability 
of recovering its losses from the below-cost pricing.94 In adjudicating 
predatory pricing claims, courts look to whether the defendant priced 
its product below its own costs. Courts deciding price squeeze claims, 
however, consider whether the defendant’s pricing conduct reduced 
or eliminated the plaintiff’s profit margins. Given the test it applied, 
the Eleventh Circuit legitimately allowed Covad’s complaint to 
survive summary judgment as a predatory pricing claim, not as a price 
squeezing claim. The Ninth Circuit failed to recognize this semantic 
error of its sister circuit and so mistakenly found a decisional split 
where none actually existed. 
B.  The Ninth Circuit’s Disregard for Considerations of Institutional 
Competence 
By allowing the plaintiffs’ complaint to survive summary 
judgment, the Ninth Circuit overestimated the institutional 
competence of the federal judiciary and underestimated the 
capabilities of the FCC. Price squeeze claims typically involve 
 
 90. Dennis Carlton, Should “Price Squeeze” Be a Recognized Form of Anticompetitive 
Conduct?, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 271, 276–77 (2008). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Covad Commc’ns Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 374 F.3d 1044, 1050 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 94. Id. 
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questions of what Judge Learned Hand in Alcoa termed “fair prices” 
and “living profits.”95 Even aside from the question of whether finding 
liability for price squeezes is good or bad economics, the 
determinations necessary to adjudicate these cases are likely beyond 
the expertise of the federal courts’ generalist judges. In Town of 
Concord, then-Judge Breyer, an expert in antitrust and regulation, 
stated as much, conceding that resolving such complex matters was 
extremely difficult for federal judges.96 The challenge becomes even 
greater when the issue of liability is left to a jury. If price squeeze 
cases are decided on the basis of crude intuition, judges and juries risk 
condemning price squeezes that are, in fact, procompetitive. 
Antitrust and regulation have the same ultimate aims: “low and 
economically efficient prices, innovation, and efficient production 
methods.”97 In markets in which the antitrust laws are the only 
constraint on dominant firms, requiring judges to act as price 
regulators may be a necessity, in spite of the institutional 
shortcomings of the federal judiciary in this realm. In markets with at 
least some regulatory oversight, however, the need for judges to set 
prices is much less compelling. Regulatory agencies have both 
specialized knowledge of their assigned industry and in-house experts 
well-versed in the economics of price regulation.98 Even if 
administrative bodies regulate only the upstream market, they may 
still be able to consider retail prices, either when prospectively setting 
wholesale prices or when retrospectively reviewing the propriety of 
those prices.99 Moreover, price regulation, given the inherently 
dynamic nature of markets, is an ongoing process—a “fair price” 
 
 95. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 436 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 96. Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 1990) (“But how is a 
judge or jury to determine a ‘fair price?’ Is it the price charged by other suppliers of the primary 
product? None exist. Is it the price that competition ‘would have set’ were the primary level not 
monopolized? How can the court determine this price without examining costs and demands, 
indeed without acting like a rate-setting regulatory agency, the rate-setting proceedings of which 
often last for several years?”). 
 97. Id. at 22. 
 98. See Sidak, supra note 88, at 295 (“In public utility regulation, the price-squeeze issue 
arises in proceedings concerning ‘access pricing’ and ‘imputation.’ Extensive economic literature 
exists on how regulators would maximize consumer welfare in the pricing of bottleneck inputs 
that a vertically integrated monopolist sells to its competitors in a downstream market.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 99. See id. at 282 (“When the duty to deal arises from regulatory compulsion, rather than 
from a prior course of voluntary dealing, and when a regulator has authority to consider 
downstream competition in regulating prices charged by a regulated monopolist for access to a 
bottleneck input, there is no occasion for a court to consider further the relationship between 
the input price and retail prices.”). 
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today may not be a “fair price” next week. Although courts are well-
suited to provide one-time remedies such as damages or injunctions, 
they are ill-equipped to handle the day-to-day monitoring that price 
regulation requires.100 Just as they are better at making the necessary 
price determinations, regulatory agencies like the FCC are more 
qualified to perform the required daily oversight for price squeeze 
remedies than are the federal courts. 
VI.  ARGUMENTS AND DISPOSITION 
A.  Strengths & Weaknesses of Pacific Bell’s Case 
The strengths of Pacific Bell’s case have largely been described 
above. First, its brief accurately points out that the Ninth Circuit 
erroneously found a circuit split on the question of price squeezing.101 
Although the D.C. Circuit expressly rejected Covad’s price squeeze 
claim in Bell Atlantic, the Eleventh Circuit incorrectly described the 
plaintiff’s predatory pricing allegations as price squeezing 
allegations.102 The former allegations inquire into the defendant’s 
profit margins, while the latter examines the plaintiff’s profit margins. 
Second, Pacific Bell rightly argued that the Ninth Circuit’s decision to 
allow a price squeeze claim in light of Verizon Communications v. 
Law Offices of Curtis Trinko was economically unsound.103 If a 
monopolist has no antitrust duty to deal with rivals, requiring it to 
deal on court-specified terms will only deter it from engaging in those 
voluntary transactions.104 
The economics that Pacific Bell used in its brief, though partly 
correct, neglected the possible harms of price squeezes. Imposing 
liability for price squeezes can have anticompetitive effects. For 
example, liability can deter price cutting and efficiency-enhancing 
vertical integration.105 Price squeezes, however, can reduce consumer 
welfare under certain conditions. They, for instance, can eliminate 
 
 100. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 415 (2004) (“An 
antitrust court is unlikely to be an effective day-to-day enforcer of these detailed sharing 
obligations.”). 
 101. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 12, at 11. 
 102. See Covad Commc’ns Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 374 F.3d 1044, 1051 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(applying the two-part Brooke Group test for predatory pricing). 
 103. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 12, at 28. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 1990). 
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equally efficient rivals and thereby chill non-price competition.106 
Exclusionary price squeezes may also entrench existing monopolies 
by creating significant barriers to entry at two market levels, instead 
of at just one.107 Although price squeezes can be procompetitive, their 
effects may not always be benign. 
B.  Strengths & Weaknesses of linkLine’s Case 
Although price squeezes can remain a useful, economically-sound 
antitrust doctrine, linkLine’s allegations are replete with the flaws of 
an earlier generation of antitrust thought. As its complaint correctly 
alleges, price squeezes can be harmful to the competitive process and 
to consumer welfare. Yet, linkLine’s allegations made no mention of 
either particular harm to consumers or why price squeezes are 
especially pernicious in the markets for broadband and DSL internet 
access. The gravamen of its complaint focused on harm to itself as an 
independent, profitable firm.108 linkLine did not cite specific harm to 
competition or consumers, such as higher prices for DSL or 
broadband service, or meaningful reduction in consumer choice, but 
rather inferred harm to competition because it felt disadvantaged.109 
Modern antitrust, however, is focused on preventing and deterring 
harm to the broader competitive process.110 Individual plaintiffs are 
granted relief only insofar as their claims are in furtherance of this 
larger goal.111 
Like the Ninth Circuit, linkLine understated the institutional 
difficulties that courts have when they adjudicate price squeeze 
claims. Price squeezes are substantially more difficult to detect and to 
remedy than predatory pricing. Predatory pricing requires that a court 
determine whether the defendant’s prices are below an appropriate 
measure of its costs—a question involving intense expert battles over 
an appropriate measure of the defendant’s costs, but a question that 
 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 24. 
 108. Brief in Opposition, supra note 81, at 10. 
 109. Id. at 4. 
 110. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 
(1993) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)). 
 111. See, e.g., Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 21–22 (1st Cir. 1990) 
(“[A] practice is not ‘anticompetitive’ simply because it harms competitors. After all, almost all 
business activity, desirable and undesirable alike, seeks to advance a firm’s fortunes at the 
expense of its competitors. Rather, a practice is ‘anticompetitive’ only if it harms the 
competitive process.”). 
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ultimately has a yes-no answer. As then-Judge Breyer noted, price 
squeezes require calculations of “fair prices” and “living profits.”112 
Regulatory bodies are vastly more qualified to make these complex 
economic and financial judgments than are judges and juries. 
C.  Likely Disposition 
The Supreme Court will likely hold that price squeezing is not a 
valid cause of action in partially-regulated industries. The existence of 
regulatory oversight from the FCC greatly mitigates the need for 
antitrust remedies to deter anticompetitive conduct. In unregulated 
markets, however, dominant firms may be able to achieve 
anticompetitive ends using price squeezes. In these markets, antitrust 
scrutiny of pricing conduct, in spite of its imperfections, may be 
necessary to preserve non-price competition and ease of entry for 
new firms. Given the possibility that price squeezing can be 
anticompetitive under certain circumstances and the Court’s prior 
reluctance in Trinko to overturn decades-old precedent,113 the Court 
in linkLine will likely issue a narrow holding and reject the call by a 
group of prominent economic and legal scholars to hold that price 
squeezes are always per se legal.114 Instead, the Court will probably 
hold that price squeezing is per se legal in sectors with at least partial 
regulatory oversight but that it still gives rise to Section 2 claims in 
fully unregulated industries. 
 
 
 112. See id. at 25. 
 113. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 409 (2004). 
Rather than overrule its prior duty-to-deal decision in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highland 
Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985), the Court said that “Aspen Skiing is at or near the outer 
boundary of § 2 liability.” 
 114. Brief of Amici Curiae Professors and Scholars in Law and Economics in support of the 
Petitioners at 8, Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2957 (Sep. 3, 2008) 
(No. 07-512). 
